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The New Frontiers of Copyright:
Enforceable Rights in the Space Age*
James 0. Moermond, III**
I. Introduction
The topic of this article is the status of international copyright
protection for intellectual property. Satellite transmissions will be
discussed as illustrative of the new stresses being placed on the tradi-
tional foundation of copyright. This analysis will attempt to de-em-
phasize perceived biases in the current literature, by two "new" ap-
proaches. The first is to shift the emphasis away from the author and
towards that of the public and publishers. The second is to shift the
emphasis away from copyright law and towards property law as a
whole, as well as space and international law. This article is intended
to help form a framework for meaningful discussion aimed at chang-
ing the foundation or base upon which current international copy-
right protection is founded.
The traditional concepts of copyright in particular, and intellec-
tual property in general, are becoming inadequate to protect the in-
terests of creators in today's global society. This inadequacy results
from a lack of consensus as to what the owners of the quasi-property,
copyright are actually entitled to as compensation and from new
technologies which strain old definitions. A new approach, a sui
generis international agreement emphasizing the transactional as-
pects of intellectual property rights should be implemented to com-
pensate for current and likely increasing deficiencies in the current
system.
Copyright will be examined in light of trilateral rights, diver-
gent perspectives, and technological challenges. These three premises
will help explain some of the reasons behind the arduous task of pro-
tecting intellectual property internationally. They are inter-related,
and have been somewhat arbitrarily divided for illustration.
* This article was entered in the 1988 Nathan Burkan Memorial Competition for papers
on the subject of copyright law and was awarded first place at the University of Denver
College of Law.
** B.S., University of Wisconsin-LaCrosse 1985; J.D., University of Denver College of
Law, 1988. The author wishes to thank Professors Christopher H. Munch and Ved P. Nanda
at the University of Denver College of Law for their thoughtful insights in the drafting of this
article.
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A. Trilateral Rights
It is important to examine copyright or intellectual property
comprehensively, recognizing the interdependent, if not equal, trilat-
eral rights of the author, publisher, and public. Copyright is particu-
larly appropriate for a trilateral approach because the rights or bene-
fits derived by one point of the triangle are dependent upon the other
two. To receive a remuneration from a work, the author needs, not
only a public willing to pay for that work, but also a publisher to
distribute that work to the public. The public needs both the author
and the publisher to benefit from the work, and the publisher in turn
requires both an author and a public to benefit from the work. "The
challenge to be faced relates to the need to protect the legitimate
interests of the authors at the same time of ensuring the widest pos-
sible public access to the authors' works via satellite and cable." 1
Initially, copyright was a concept used to protect book publish-
ers. Copyright "later was supplemented with concepts defined in
terms of rights granted to the author."2 There has since "arisen a
confusion between the protection of the publisher and the protection
of the author, with the former being able to hide, as it were, behind
the author, despite their often conflicting interests."' Confusion and
conflict are increased when considered in light of the essential re-
quirements for information in modern economies.
A majority of the literature on copyright protection for satellite
broadcasts tends to focus on the rights of the author, defending their
copyright. However, "bias, and fear of bias, make an author's judg-
ment on copyright a little unreliable."4 "This defensive attitude also
has the unfortunate result that a critical analysis of copyright con-
cepts and practices is taken as an attack on those who are protected
by copyright."5 The issue then is whether the traditional copyright is
the best way to govern access and control over the work in question.
B. Divergent Perspectives
International protection of intellectual property rights and the
dissemination of information raise some fundamental ideological
conflicts that have frustrated a uniform or universally accepted copy-
1. M.H. PICHLER, Copyright Problems of Satellite Transmissions of Programme-Carry-
ing Signals in Western Europe in PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-NINTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE
LAW OF OUTER SPACE 128 (1986).
2. E.W. PLOMAN & L.C. HAMILTON, COPYRIGHT: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE IN-
FORMATION AGE 178 (1980) [hereinafter PLOMAN & HAMILTON]; see, e.g., Statute of Anne, 8
Anne c.19 (1709).
3. PLOMAN & HAMILTON, supra note 2, at 178.
4. A. PLANT, The Economic Aspects of Copyright in Books, in ECONOMICA, May, 1934,
at 168, cited in PLOMAN & HAMILTON, supra note 2, at 176.
5. PLOMAN & HAMILTON, supra note 2, at 176.
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right law. Specifically, divergent political, economic and cultural ap-
proaches have resulted in equally divergent legal approaches to the
protection of intellectual property. "Different interests and changing
balances of power are observable in the process of forming the inter-
national practice and legal regulation in this special field of space
law and even of international copyright law."6
1. Commodity vs. Resource Dichotomy.--Generally stated,
the author, or copyright owner, has the exclusive right to sell, per-
form, or authorize distribution of the work. Thus the author retains
some rights in the work after such a transaction.
As to the legal nature of copyright, it must be emphasized
'the author's right is not a property right either, as understood
under the law of property it can only be subsumed under the
broader category of intellectual property if the latter is under-
stood as a special term in common parlance for exclusive rights
sui generis, resulting from intellectual creations. The label "in-
tellectual property" proved to be a mere indication of the exclu-
sive nature of the rights in intellectual creations rather than a
legal classification there of.'1
Simply stated, "property" is 'subject to many different and valid
interpretations. Private ownership, in the American sense of the
word, does not exist in communist or socialist states. Private versus
state or public ownership of property raises the vital issue of how
copyright is to be characterized. The dichotomy of a commodity ver-
sus resource approach presents itself.
2. Commodity Approach to Copyright Characteriza-
tion.-"The concept of information as a commodity has. . . evolved
in countries with a market economy."8 The commodity concept is
based upon the notion that certain information, which may or may
not be copyrighted, is capable of being bought and sold. The respec-
6. I. SZILAGYI, International Copyright Questions of Indirect Broadcasts by Satellites,
in PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-SECOND COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 213
(1979). To a large extent these opposing perspectives or viewpoints have frustrated uniform
laws on many issues, both internationally and domestically. For example, within the United
States the Uniform Commercial Code is subject to many different state interpretations. Al-
though these deviations are generally minor, they illustrate the problem of reaching a common
ground for laws within one nation, let alone on an international plane.
7. I. SZILAGYI, Space Law-Copyright-Neighboring Rights: A Theoretical Approach, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-SEVENTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 197
(1984), citing G. Boytha, Whose Right is Copyright?, 85 GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSCHUTZ UND
URHEBERRECHT, INTERNATIONALER TELL, 379-385 (1983). Perhaps the biggest obstacle
preventing intellectual property, including copyrights, from being wholly accepted as property
in the classic sense is the inherent restraint on alienability imposed on those who wish to use
the work. While this does not remove the work from the rubric of property, it does make the fit
somewhat more uncomfortable for copyright owners.
8. PLOMAN & HAMILTON, supra note 2, at 218.
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tive values to the buyer and seller are protected within the concept of
the transferability of a private property interest.
3. Resource Approach to Copyright Characterization.-In
contrast, the concept of information as a resource is related to the
notion of res communis, or the common heritage of mankind. The
resource concept essentially precludes an individual nation from ex-
ercising the property right of exclusion by denying appropriation in
the name of the common heritage of mankind. This principle is em-
bodied in such international agreements as the Convention on the
High Seas at Article 2,1 the Antarctic Treaty at Article 14(2),10 and
the Outer Space Treaty at Article 2.11 The Radio Regulations of the
International Telecommunications Conference also consider space to
be the common property of mankind, not subject to private or indi-
vidual state ownership. 2 However, these agreements regulate natu-
ral resources, not intellectual property or human creations.
4. Effects within Socialist and Developing
States.-Developing states tend to view some information, gathered
by remote sensing for example, as not only important for economic
development, but necessary for survival. The withholding of vital
crop statistics in lieu of high copyright payments is viewed by some
developing states more as criminal extortion threatening starvation,
and less as the mere operation of market forces. The withholding of
this information also inhibits economic development resulting from
agricultural or natural resources.
The importance of information lies in its role as a central
factor in decision-making, including all matters related to devel-
opment. Information is a precondition for identifying alterna-
tives, reducing uncertainties about their implications, and facili-
tating their implementation. As such, information is a critical
resource, not the least for enhancing the negotiating capabilities
of developing countries in the pursuit of clearly defined objec-
tives, in particular in dealing with transnational corporations. 3
The Socialist and developing states tend to view individual or
9. Done at Geneva, April 29, 1958, entered into force for the U.S., Sept. 30, 1962, 13
U.S.T. 2313, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82.
10. Done at Washington, Dec. 1, 1959, entered into force for the U.S., June 23, 1961,
12 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No. 4780, 402 U.N.T.S. 71.
11. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use
of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, done at Washington, London,
and Moscow, Jan. 27, 1967, entered into force for the U.S., Oct. 10, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410,
T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter OUTER SPACE TREATY].
12. Radio Regulations, infra note 49, art. N28/7.
13. U.N. CENTER FOR TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, TRANSBORDER DATA FLOWS:
ACCESS TO THE INTERNATIONAL ON-LINE DATABASE MARKET (New York: United Nations,
1983); cited in OTA, infra note 20, at 229.
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group intellectual work product as the property of society as a whole.
Adolf Dietz suggests that associations of authors and users are simi-
lar to labor unions and that agreements between them should be
viewed as collective bargaining agreements. This is evidence of a
"trend implying that copyright should be detached from the domain
of property rights and be brought into the area of labour law." '14 "To
some extent, this line of reasoning seems to bring the market-ori-
ented approach closer to the principles that have been adopted in
socialist countries." 5
5. Rights of Author and Public in Context of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.-Interestingly, the Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights 6 recognizes both the interests of the public
and copyright owners at Article 27.
(1) Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cul-
tural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in
scientific advancement and its benefits.
(2) Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral
and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or
artistic production of which he is the author.
To some extent, a law or doctrine which recognizes both these
rights is at war with itself. These rights, however, are not mutually
exclusive. The problem surfaces when one tries to strike a balance
between them. Different cultures, economies, and governments re-
spond differently to changing needs for copyrighted materials or in-
formation. It is in this context that domestic and, more importantly,
international legal frameworks for governing the exchange of infor-
mation are needed if a just, value for value, transactional atmo-
sphere is to survive. The creation of such an environment is what
should become the goal of international intellectual property law.
The alternative could well be what copyright owners would perceive
as a taking, possibly causing them to guard the works more closely,
or possibly not to create them at all.
C. Technological Challenges
Satellite transmissions are just one example of how the advances
of technology have rendered copyright protection more difficult to
14. PLOMAN & HAMILTON, supra note 2, at 46; see A. DIETZ, LE DROIT D'AUTEUR
DANS LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENE: ANALYSE COMPARATIVE DES LEGISLATIONS NATIONALES
RELATIVES AU DROIT D'AUTEUR FACE AUX DISPOSITIONS DU TRAITE INSTITUANT LA COM-
MUNAUTE ECONOMIQUE EUROPECHE, Commission of the European Communities, Brussels
(1976).
15. PLOMAN & HAMILTON, supra note 2, at 46.
16. UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, Dec. 10, 1948, U.N.G.A. RES. 217 A
(III), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS].
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enforce internationally. 17 Enforcement is further hampered by vari-
ous multi-media publications or packages. For example, movies can
be broadcast in the traditional sense, transmitted by satellite, or dis-
tributed through videodiscs or cassettes. Add to this the fact that
technology has increased scope or area of distribution from regional
to global proportions. In the case of satellites, technology is presently
unable to limit geographically the "footprint" 18 of satellite transmis-
sions. This results in broadcasts or distributions which are not lim-
ited by political boundaries. Thus, multi-media publications, trans-
mitted to multiple jurisdictions, subject a single movie with an
identified copyright interest, to multiple laws.
"While these advances should not be seen as presenting dangers
but opportunities, the point is made that the new media all share one
central characteristic: They involve the use of protected works on a
scale and in a manner that precludes the possibility of individual
control."19 This results in authors and users forming associations and
national governments concluding treaties to resolve new copyright
problems as they arise. These new arrangements, again, may be
viewed as shifting away from the strict market-orientation which has
resulted in either authors or users having unfavorable bargaining
power within the "triangle."
Because the present set of international legal regulatory re-
gimes and institutions are generally linked to a particular tech-
nology, new combinations of older technologies might, like new
technologies, create inconsistencies between traditionally sepa-
rate policies and institutions. To deal with such cross-cutting is-
sues, the international protection for intellectual property may
need to be considered in a larger social, legal, and technical
context."
II. International Conventions
There are four conventions closely related to copyright protec-
tion for satellite broadcasts that will be discussed in this paper.
While they do not represent all the conventions or treaties that could
17. See generally OTA, infra note 20; PLOMAN & HAMILTON, supra note 2, at 148-74.
18. A satellite footprint is "the area of the earth's surface in which satellite transmis-
sions can be received . . . Note that a footprint is a fluid concept and not a static one. Its size
will depend on the technical characteristics of the receiving dish and environmental conditions.
Therefore, a particular satellite transmission will have one footprint when 10-foot earth based
dishes are being used and another one when 3-foot dishes are being used." MOTION PICTURE
EXPORT ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, INC., MPEAA MEMORANDUM ON THE USES OF SATELLITE
TECHNOLOGY 9 (1984).
19. PLOMAN & HAMILTON, supra note 2, at 180.
20. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN AN AGE
OF ELECTRONICS AND INFORMATION 249 (1987) [hereinafter OTA].
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possibly be applied, they are representative of the current law."
A. The Berne Convention
The Berne Convention 2 is significant for satellite transmissions
because it grants express protection to authors' rights and against
the unauthorized use of their works in Article 1 Ibis. The Berne Con-
vention also affords authors the exclusive right to authorize broad-
casts of their works. A broadcast is defined as the "wireless diffu-
sions of signs, sounds, or images."2
It could be argued that since the drafters did not mention "sat-
ellite transmission" they were not intended to be covered. This logic,
however, "proves too much" as it would render many types of trans-
missions, either known or unknown, to be "outside" the Berne
Convention.
There is "[nlo doubt that direct broadcasting by satellite comes
under the ruling of Article 1 Ibis of the Berne Convention, since
technically there is no third party who could intervene between the
original organization and the general public. 214 Here, there is, "no
question who should be paying royalties."25
There is some question, however, as to whether Article 1 Ibis
applies when the satellite transmissions are retransmitted by foreign
or non-authorized cable TV systems. One school of thought contends
retransmissions of this nature are indeed broadcasts under the Berne
Convention. While another camp holds that the term "broadcasting"
refers "only to the transmission of signals that can be received di-
rectly by the public." 26 Such retransmissions are not protected under
the Berne Convention.
A suitable legal base for throwing the responsibility upon
the originating organization can only be established if we intro-
duce the notion of a sui generis satellite broadcasting right by
an international treaty. This solution would not affect Article
1 bis of the Berne Convention for technical reasons and would
21. For a more complete discussion of the relative international agreements see gener-
ally JOHNSTON, COPYRIGHT HANDBOOK 115-24 (1982); OTA, supra note 20, at 216-18;
PLOMAN & HAMILTON, supra note 2.
22. The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, opened for
signature Sept. 9, 1886, revised Nov. 13, 1908, revised Mar. 20, 1914, revised June 2, 1928,
revised June 26, 1948, revised July 24, 1971; 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter BERNE CONVEN-
TION]; reprinted in 4 M. NIMMER. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT app. 27 (1979). On October 31,
1988, the United States ratified the Berne Convention with the Berne Convention Implementa-
tion Act of 1988, H.R. 4262 100th Cong., 2nd. Sess. 568 (1988). See also, 37 BNA PATENT,
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 462 (Mar. 9, 1989).
23. Id. art. I I bis(1).
24. I. SZILAGYI, supra note 7, at 199.
25. Id.
26. See T.J. CRYAN & J.S. CRANE, International Telecommunications Pirates: Protect-
ing U.S. Satellite Signals From Unauthorized Reception Abroad, 17 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. &
POL. 851, at 867 (1985) [hereinafter CRYAN & CRANE].
Winter 1989]
DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
serve the interests of the authors much better and effectively
since the collection of royalties could be effected at the source
where the works are used.2"
The Berne Convention employs the "national treatment" princi-
ple 28 which means that foreign authors, or copyright owners, enjoy
the same protections as domestic authors. The system of "national
treatment" actually creates a group mechanism for bilateral applica-
tion of national or domestic laws. In this sense, it does not create a
new uniform copyright law, but rather, codifies a conflicts of law
system, specially geared towards copyright law. Violations of the
Berne Convention are punishable subject to national implementation
law. 29 Enforcement under the Berne Convention, however, is con-
trolled by the International Court of Justice (ICJ), 30 unless the
states involved have agreed to a different method of dispute resolu-
tion. Since each state must submit to the jurisdiction of the ICJ, a
judicial settlement of copyright disputes may be unlikely.31
The U.S. has not adhered to the Berne Convention because Ar-
ticle 2 and 2bis would require the U.S. to change its domestic copy-
right law. Particularly offensive to the U.S. is the "automatic recog-
nition of copyright without any formalities, the protection of 'moral'
rights and the retroactivity of copyright protection with respect to
works which are already in the public domain in the United
States. '32 The U.S. is currently considering membership in the
Berne Convention, however, the merits of that debate are beyond the
scope of this article.
B. The Universal Copyright Convention
The Universal Copyright Convention (UCC)3 3 was formed by
the U.S. and other states not willing to sign the Berne Convention.
Article 4bis of the UCC grants copyright owners "the exclusive right
to authorize the reproduction by any means, public performance and
broadcasting." While Article 4bis does recognize the author's "eco-
nomic interests" it does not expressly recognize them as being prop-
erty interests per se, rather only one stick in the bundle, the right to
exclude.
27. 1. SZILAGYI, supra note 7, at 200.
28. BERNE CONVENTION, supra note 22, art. 5(3).
29. Id., art. 36.
30. Id., art. 33.
31. See generally I.C.J. Stat. art. 36(2), done at San Francisco, June 26, 1945, entered
into force for the U.S., Oct. 24, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993, 3 Bevans 1153, 1976
Y.B.U.N. 1052.
32. S. Rep. No. 5, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1953).
33. Universal Copyright Convention, opened for signature Sept. 6, 1952, revised July
24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, T.I.A.S. No. 7868, 216 U.N.T.S. 134 [hereinafter UCC]; reprinted
in 4 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHTs app. 25 (1979).
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The UCC, like the Berne Convention, employs the principle of
"national treatment" in Article 2. Again, this creates a system of
bilateral agreements rather than one comprehensive law. There is an
important distinction, however, between the UCC and Berne Con-
vention regarding the application of national treatment. The UCC
makes no attempt at reciprocity or equality of protective rights.
"[T]here is no minimum level of protection within the UCC for a
foreign author to rely upon, neither can he claim the level of protec-
tion from his country of origin in another contracting country."3"
This may or may not be beneficial to states with low levels of protec-
tion as they can avoid royalty payments on imported works, but it is
certainly dubious as an incentive for improved protection of
copyrights.
Under the UCC, like the Berne Convention, the applicability of
"broadcasting" to satellite transmissions and retransmissions is un-
certain. "[T]he UCC regime has not begun to develop norms on the
role of the Convention with regard to modern electronic technolo-
gies." 5 Enforcement or dispute resolution is governed by "the Inter-
national Court of Justice for determination"3 " if no other method
can be negotiated.
"Furthermore, the recent U.S. decision to withdraw from
UNESCO means that future UNESCO-moderated negotiations re-
garding UCC protection of satellite signals will not reflect U.S. in-
terests. '37 Of course, a U.S. copyright owner faced with no mini-
mum level of protection abroad might argue that they never did,
thus reflecting the increased politicization and polarization which in-
fluenced the U.S. withdrawal from UNESCO.38
C. The Brussels Satellite Convention
The Brussels Satellite Convention 9 is the only international
convention with the goal of preventing the theft of satellite transmis-
sions. The Brussels Convention covers both radio and T.V. signals.4
Member States are to take "adequate measures to prevent the distri-
bution on or from its territory of any programme-carrying signal by
any distributor for whom the signal emitted is not intended." '41 The
Convention does not impose new laws on its members, nor does it
34. PLOMAN & HAMILTON, supra note 2, at 59.
35. CRYAN & CRANE, supra note 26, at 870.
36. UCC, supra note 33, art. 15.
37. CRYAN & CRANE, supra note 27, at 870 (citation omitted).
38. See S. FINGER, Reform or Withdrawal, 61 FOREIGN SERVICE J. 18-23 (1984).
39. Convention Relating to the Distribution of Programme-Carrying Signals Transmit-
ted by Satellite, opened for signature May 21, 1974, 13 I.L.M. 1444 [hereinafter Brussels
Convention]. The U.S. is currently a member of the Brussels Convention.
40. Id., art. 1.
41. Id., art. 2(1).
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establish a national treatment structure. Members are free to create
a new copyright or neighboring right, property interests, civil, crimi-
nal, commercial, or administrative regulatory controls. The focus of
Article 2 is on the unauthorized distribution, not reception of satel-
lite transmissions.
The Brussels Convention protects the "neighboring right" of the
broadcaster and not the "copyright" of the author; the Convention
protects the container and not its contents. The "Convention offered
to the owners of intellectual property no enlargement of established
property rights. Rather, it afforded at the world level a means
whereby existing property rights might not be used by pirates or
poachers to the detriment of the owner.""2 Further, it allows "the
broadcasting services, e.g., originating organizations, and the cre-
ators of program content to adopt a common stand against potential
poachers.'1 3
Copyright owners, however, may not have sufficient bargaining
power to take such a stand under the Brussels Convention. It has
been said that the "convention is absolutely insufficient to protect the
copyright interests of authors. The context of this convention only
reflects the basic interests of the great broadcasting organizations
and those of the authors are almost totally omitted.""
The Brussels Convention expressly excludes direct broadcast
satellite signals. 5 Article 4 contains several exceptions from cover-
age that could conceivably exclude many signals. For example, re-
ports or current events used for educational purposes, programs
quoted in compliance with "fair practice," or programs distributed
for solely educational purposes are all excluded." Article 7 seeks to
guard against the "abuses of monopoly." At what point the exercise
of a copyright becomes an "abuse of monopoly" under any given
member's law is uncertain to say the least. Again, we are faced with
the problem of where to draw the line between private and public
rights.
D. The International Telecommunications Conference
The International Telecommunications Conference (ITC)47
which is administered through its Radio Regulations4. 8 is adhered to
42. C. CHRISTOL, The 1974 Brussels Convention Relating to the Distribution of Pro-
gram-Carrying Signals Transmitted by Satellite: Its Strengths and Weaknesses, in PROCEED-
INGS OF THE TWENTIETH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 44 (1977).
43. Id., at 91.
44. 1. SZILAGYI, supra note 6, at 214 (1979).
45. Brussels Convention, supra note 39, art. 3.
46. Id., art. 4.
47. The International Telecommunications Conference, latest revision Oct. 25, 1973, 28
U.S.T. 2495, T.I.A.S. No. 8572.
48. The Radio Regulations, latest revision July 17, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 1527, T.I.A.S. No.
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by at least 157 nations.49 Article 17 of the Radio Regulations re-
quires members to prevent and prohibit "(a) the unauthorized inter-
ception of radio communications not intended for the general use of
the public [and] ...(b) publication or any use whatsoever, without
authorization,. . . obtained by the interception of radio communica-
tions mentioned [in paragraph (a) above]."
Article 1 of the Radio Regulations defines Broadcasting Satel-
lite Service as a "radio communication service in which signals
transmitted by space stations are intended for direct reception by the
general public." A space station is defined as "[o]ne or more trans-
mitters or receivers or a combination of transmitters and receivers,
including the accessory equipment . . . located on an object which is
beyond, is intended to go beyond, or has been beyond, the major
portion of the Earth's atmosphere."50 Individual and community re-
ceptions are covered by Article 1 as well.
While it is clear that satellite transmissions are intended to be
covered by the ITC and Radio Regulations, the definition of "broad-
casting" or perhaps more accurately, its interpretation has hampered
uniform enforcement with regard to satellite broadcasts and related
copyrights. Under the ITC those receiving signals argue that all sat-
ellite signals are intended for use by the general public, and thus
Article 17 does not apply. Those seeking copyright protection argue
that their satellite signals are not intended for use by the general
public, but rather, the signals are intended for only the paying pub-
lic. The ITC, like many international agreements, has no effective
enforcement mechanism. Article 50 of the ITC merely allows the
parties to a dispute to settle it among themselves or submit the dis-
pute to arbitration.
The great success of the ITC is attributed to its subject matter.
The ITC is generally concerned with transmission frequencies and
orbit/spectrum efficiency, not with copyright protection for authors.
The ITC regulates a natural resource with physical characteristics
that are not subject to appropriation, 51 or human alterations.5" Copy-
right owners are not so much concerned with the road their works
take to the public, as they are with being paid for making the deliv-
7435. The Radio Regulations are similar to the U.S. Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 601
(1985).
49. Georgetown Space Law Group, The Geostationary Orbit: Legal, Technical, and Po-
litical Issues Surrounding its Use in World Telecommunications, 16 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
223, 237 n.68 (1984).
50. Radio Regulations, supra note 48, art. 1.
51. Id., art. N28/7.
52. See generally FLEMING, DUCHARME, JAKHU & LONGMAN, State Sovereignty and
the Effective Management of a Shared Universal Resource: Observations Drawn From Exam-
ining Developments in the International Regulation of Radiocommunication, 10 ANNALS OF
AIR AND SPACE L. 327 (1985).
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ery possible.
III. Analysis
A. Definitional Aspects
A common problem in the four conventions discussed above is
the failure to clarify the definition of a "broadcast," and when a
broadcast is intended for the general public. This obstacle "is inher-
ent in the legal definition of 'broadcast' which does not include sig-
nals not directly receivable by the public.""3 At least three distinct
broadcasting services and their attendant legal frameworks have
been identified. 54 First, domestic broadcasting satellite service occurs
when "the general public directly receiving satellite signals [is] .. .
within the jurisdiction of the administration which has registered the
transmitting satellite with the International Telecommunications
Union (ITU). ' ' 5
Second, transborder satellite service occurs when "the signal be-
ing directly received outside the jurisdiction of the transmitting sat-
ellite's administration is the same signal as that being received inside
the jurisdiction of that administration. ' 56 Third, an international
broadcasting satellite service occurs when "the signal being directly
received outside the jurisdiction of the transmitting satellite's admin-
istration is a different signal from that being received inside the ju-
risdiction of that administration. '57
The problem of transborder broadcasting involves the signal's
footprint or "spillover" effect.58 Copyright owners face enforcement
problems when signals carrying their programs are transmitted by a
domestic broadcasting service and received where they are either not
intended, or where those receiving the signal are not compelled by
law to make royalty payments. For example:
As with nearly every other island in the Caribbean, there is
wholesale video and signal piracy in Jamaica ...Many homes
and commercial facilities such as hotels have Television Receive
only dishes that intercept satellite signals without authorization.
One of these has been operated by the Jamaica Broadcast Com-
pany, a government owned operation that has intercepted mo-
tion picture programming and rebroadcast it to the entire island
without charge. The impact of such practices is self-evident. 9
53. I. MORA, infra note 60, at 58.
54. M.A. ROTHBLATT, Transborder Broadcasting Satellite Service, in PROCEEDINGS OF
THE TWENTY-FIFTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 322 (1982).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See MPEAA, supra note 18.
59. Motion Picture Association of America, Inc., Brief Description of Film Piracy, for
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Of course, this view is not universal. "The opponents even say: an
opera transmitted by radio from Austria can be heard in Hungary
- and on short waves even in distant Australia - and nobody
dreamed of asking an additional fee for that. Why, then for
television? '"60
In the case of an international broadcast, the transmission is
intended for an audience outside of the jurisdiction of the broad-
caster. While such a transmission may also have the "transborder"
effect mentioned above, the intent of the copyright owner is less clear
cut than when only a domestic broadcast is intended. This is so be-
cause the copyright owner has intentionally subjected his copyright
interest to the uncertainties of multi-jurisdictional enforcement. It is
only less clear because it is well known that domestic broadcasts by
satellite are subject to transborder or spillover effects. This is the
same dilemma facing U.S. copyright owners when their broadcasted
works spillover into Latin America and Canada."1
B. Property Aspects
Another problem facing copyright owners is the extent to which
intellectual property is placed within the rubric of property in its
"traditional" sense. Specifically, does the copyright owner get all the
sticks in the bundle? In American jurisprudence, the answer is gen-
erally yes. Internationally, however, this concept may not hold true.
The author may only have a right to be paid for his time, which
could be significantly less valuable than an ownership right. The di-
vergent perspectives on what constitutes property rights are a funda-
mental chasm preventing the international enforcement of
copyrights.
This is particularly apparent when the concept of an "interna-
tional commons" is applied to transmission signals in the sense that
they are receivable and more importantly, when it is applied to infor-
mation, regardless of whether it is copyrighted. Copyright owners
might point to the Universal Declaration on Human Rights which
provides that "[N]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his prop-
erty." 2 If the information received, however, is viewed as an inter-
national commons, i.e., not subject to appropriation, then there is no
property and thus no deprivation.
U.S. Department of State International Copyright Panel, Mar. 22, 1985, p.3.1; cited in OTA,
supra note 20, at 245.
60. 1. MORA, The Future of Direct Transmissions Via Satellite From the Aspect of the
Author, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-SECOND COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER
SPACE 58 (1979).
61. See generally Note, Signal Piracy: The Theft of United States Satellite Signals, 8
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 62, 83-92 (1984); MPEAA, supra note 18.
62. Human Rights, supra note 16, art. 17(2).
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Proponents of this application of the concept of international
commons may also cite the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
for support in receiving, or reducing to possession, satellite signals
for themselves. "Everyone has the right to . . . receive and impart
information and ideas through any media and regardless of fron-
tiers." 3 More importantly, "[e]veryone has the right freely to par-
ticipate in the cultural life of the community . . . [and] to share in
scientific advancement and its benefits." (emphasis added)." The
Radio Regulations which govern satellite transmission also preclude
private ownership of outer space.6 5 Additionally, Article 1 of the
Outer Space Treaty provides that outer space shall be used for the
benefit of all countries, "and shall be the province of all mankind.""6
Article 1 further provides that outer space shall be used "without
discrimination of any kind, on a basis of equality."6 7
These advocates claim that since some distributors of satellite
transmissions will be discriminated against in favor of others, space
will not be available on the basis of equal access or "without dis-
crimination of any kind." These arguments, however, are erroneous
and may actually work to the detriment of the less developed coun-
tries who tend to support this view.
First, "international cooperation is not a principle founded upon
the notion of 'gift' but, rather it is the operation as a whole ....
[T]o have an operation as a whole, there must be a shared activity.
Otherwise, an 'enrichment sans cause' would be legitimated." 8
Second, if copyright law, space law, and international law are to
be in accord with the principles of justice, the rights of all the parties
must be protected. To the extent that distribution without compensa-
tion is allowed, the rights of the authors and publishers are sacri-
ficed. If our "triangle" is to remain intact, this situation is not sus-
tainable. "[A]s between all sellers and buyers there is a need to
assure the effective and uninterrupted transmission of intellectual
property." 9
Initially, the costs of signal piracy will be paid by authorized
distributors and customers.
If the broadcaster cannot guarantee control over the re-
transmission of a particular program to audiences within a spe-
cific country or geographic area, he will be called upon to pay
63. Id., art. 19.
64. Id., art. 27(1).
65. RADIO REGULATIONS, supra note 48, art. N28/7.
66. OUTER SPACE TREATY, supra note 11, art. 1.
67. Id.
68. M.A. FERRER, The Brussels Convention Concerning the Protection of Signals
Transmitted from Satellites, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEVENTEENTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE
LAW OF OUTER SPACE 28 (1974).
69. C. CHRISTOL, supra note 42, at 83.
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his program contributors for coverage in the additional area.
That area is likely to include countries offering no legal protec-
tion, under the concepts of copyright or neighboring rights,
against the retransmission of the programs on their territories. If
the originating broadcaster receives no benefit from the ex-
panded coverage, he is unlikely to be willing to pay program
contributors substantially higher licensing fees to cover it, and
the result could well be a decision not to use the satellite at all."'
Since there are a greater number of less developed states, it fol-
lows that they will have more rights to protect. While their current
focus is on the right to receive the transmission, and thus informa-
tion, soon they will have distributors and authors with rights in need
of protection. It is therefore in the interests of both developed and
less developed states to protect intellectual property rights being
transmitted via satellite." The difficulty is in balancing the trilateral
rights involved so that our triangle does not collapse.
C. Trade or Business Aspects: The Issue and the Answer
Information is becoming more important for economic success;
it is a vital commodity. In the U.S., industries relying on copyright
law for remuneration "showed growth in sales from $6.2 million, or
2 percent of the gross national product (GNP), in 1954 to $140.9
billion, or approximately 5 percent of the GNP, in 1982. ' '72 One "es-
timate notes that the world information market equaled approxi-
mately $350 billion or 18 percent of world trade in 1980."' S Un-
doubtedly, information is valuable and copyright is but one method
of protecting that value. While information, whether copyrighted or
not, is recognized as being an item of trade or of having value, it is
perhaps ironic that most, if not all, international agreements drafted
to protect the interests of the authors, do not deal with information
as a commodity.
The rights of the authors to control their works are vitiated be-
cause those works do not enjoy a universally accepted status as an
item of trade, like "goods" for example. This is a result of the au-
thors' desire or need to control the works distribution after the initial
"sale," or transaction. That the sale has "strings attached" does not
sit well with many buyers.. Therefore, because copyright law does not
70. Draft Report of the General Rapporteur [to the Brussels Satellite Convention], 13
I.L.M. 1449 (1974).
71. See generally M.A. FERRER, supra note 68.
72. OTA, supra note 20, at 225 (1987); M.H. RUBIN, THE COPYRIGHT INDUSTRIES IN
THE UNITED STATES: AN ECONOMIC REPORT PREPARED FOR THE AMERICAN COPYRIGHT
COUNCIL 1 (1985).
73. OTA, supra note 20, at 225; C.J. HAMELINK, TRANSNATIONAL DATA FLOWS IN AN
INFORMATION AGE 23 (1984).
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allow the buyer to exercise dominion in the same way that a buyer of
goods may, international copyright agreements have not given this
aspect much attention.
This problem has been partially solved by licensing agreements
restricting the use of the work sold. Logically, the foundations of
successful licensing agreements could be incorporated into an inter-
national agreement on information, allowing it to be treated as a
commodity.
1. Trade Sanction Protections.-The transactional nature of
information or the value of intellectual property rights is an impor-
tant trade issue. In an attempt to protect U.S. intellectual property
owners abroad, the Trade and Tariff Act of 19841" allows the Presi-
dent to condition qualification for trade preferences under the Gen-
eralized System of Preferences (GSP) 75 upon, among other things,
protection of U.S. copyrights. The Caribbean Basin Economic Re-
covery Act 76 uses a "carrot and stick" approach by listing the pro-
tection of U.S. copyrighted works broadcast in the Caribbean Basin
as a condition to be considered for those states to receive U.S. aid.
Another program is the International Security and Development Act
of 1983 (ISDCA), 77 which allows the President to consider the ex-
tent to which a foreign government participates or tolerates the
broadcasting within its borders of U.S. copyrighted materials with-
out the permission of the authors or owners.78 The ISDCA also ad-
dresses the Federal Communication Commission's authority over
transborder broadcasting.79
Such unilateral trade sanctions, however, may not be helpful in
the long run as they are not based on universally accepted principles.
Thus, they may cause resentment towards the U.S. for imposing its
laws on other states.
Furthermore, economic or trade sanctions do not seem appropri-
ate for copyright treaties not concerned with economic or trade rela-
tions per se. The logical solution is to treat intellectual property as a
commodity within existing agreements or fashion a sui generis intel-
lectual property trade agreement.
2. GATT Protection.-One existing agreement that may suit-
ably include information-based products or services within its frame-
work is the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).8"
74. Pub. L. 98-573.
75. S. Rep. No. 485, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. I (1984).
76. Pub. L. 98-67.
77. H.R. Rep. No. 2992, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1 (1983).
78. H.R. Rep. No. 192, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. 4, Sec. 904 (1983).
79. See Note, supra note 61, at 90-92.
80. U.N. Conf. on Trade and Employment, signed at Geneva, Oct. 30, 1947, 55
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There are several advantages to using the GATT. First, the provision
of existing international enforcement mechanisms with trade sanc-
tions is a viable means of preventing intellectual property infringe-
ment. Such enforcement mechanisms are not part of existing copy-
right conventions. Second, the GATT has broader support than the
copyright conventions and a history of building consensus among its
members. Third, the GATT recognizes the different needs and abili-
ties of its developed and less developed members."1
3. Contractual Agreements.-The notion of copyrighted works
being sold in a contractual setting and therefore being controlled by
an agreement based on contractual principles, is logical and desira-
ble. When signals are "pirated" or "poached" there is, in effect, the
formation of an implied contract. In the case of nations within a
satellite signal's footprint, the position of the receiving state is that
since they have neither sought nor asked for the signals they should
not have to pay for them. To the extent that the signal can be re-
ceived and is used for personal or household use, this notion is some-
what controversial and evokes fair use considerations.
In terms of a "rebroadcast" for profit, however, it may be said
that the original signal constitutes an offer to use that signal for
profit and that its subsequent use for profit is an acceptance. The
value of this contract and its measure of damages is also a point of
conflict. Damages can be measured by either the actual losses of sig-
nal piracy, none, or by the theory of lost profits or the benefit of the
bargain in a contractual setting, or perhaps what is known equitably
as unjust enrichment. These damages may be substantial.
4. A New Framework of Protection.-A sui generis agree-
ment governing the sale of intellectual property internationally is a
logical solution for several reasons. First, the issue would appear to
be the compensation of authors for their works, which entails recog-
nition and enforcement of a contractual relationship between all
points of our triangle. By recognizing the triangle as an important
aspect of international trade, a broad-based, or multi-product en-
forcement mechanism could be validly incorporated. Trade sanctions
for intellectual property infringement would be legitimized.
Second, as discussed above, technology is quickly eroding the
traditional aspects of copyright and the doctrinal boundaries between
copyright and other forms of intellectual property. A contractual or
trade-based agreement could avoid this problem. If recognition of
intellectual property as a valuable commodity, whether subject to
U.N.T.S. 187.
81. See OTA, supra note 20, at 228.
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copyright, patent, or other protection, in a generic sense is adopted,
the particular form will not inhibit remuneration of its creator. An
agreement recognizing the enforceability of a value for value or con-
tractual relationship would emphasize the sale itself, not what is be-
ing sold as such. This is desirable because the basic idea of buyers
and sellers or contractual relationships has essentially remained in-
tact since time immemorial. Conversely, the proliferation of technol-
ogy and information-based products and services has challenged
traditional concepts of copyright dramatically."' A sui generis, trans-
action based agreement for intellectual property would not be as eas-
ily influenced by technological advances as the existing copyright
conventions are proving to be.
Third, unions, societies, and associations of authors representing
the interests of copyright owners could conclude agreements with va-
rious satellite broadcasters or publishers for the collection of royalty
fees. Non-compliance would then be sanctioned by a pre-determined
formula of trade sanctions, such as tariffs, resembling liquidated
damages in a contract. "[A] Clearing House could be set up to col-
lect such fees internationally, and distribute them internationally to
the authors whose works have thus been used."8 In operation such a
system would be very similar to U.S. law. This new international
regime should be "a system in which no individual licenses would be
required but rather a general (compulsory) license against a statu-
tory fee. Those to whom this system seems to be far-fetched should
be reminded of the latest U.S. legislation in the matter of cable tele-
vision and phonograph recordings.""' Each member state's "union"
of authors would be represented at the state level within the larger
"union" of states.
The adoption of a new sui generis agreement would require a
quasi-governmental organization or regime. This could be estab-
lished within an existing regime like the ITU or the GATT, or it
could be established independently. Since such a regime would be
sui generis, its independent establishment might be preferable. The
GATT, however, because of its established enforcement mechanism
may also be desirable. The ITU should be left to regulating natural
resources and not trade relations.
IV. Conclusion
The adoption of such an agreement would be difficult to say the
least. There are many complex issues involved and widespread disa-
greement on fundamental concepts. These issues should not be con-
82. See generally PLOMAN & HAMILTON, supra note 2, at 148-74.
83. I. MORA, supra note 60, at 58.
84. Id.
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sidered as trade frictions, but rather as the adjustment process of
trade systems. This adjustment process will require considerable ef-
fort towards a meaningful, multilateral understanding and accept-
ance of diverse legal systems. It is my proposition that a sui generis
intellectual property trade agreement be pursued as a new and hope-
fully enduring approach to this difficult issue.
Implicit in the adoption of such an agreement are the premises
that authors or creators have the right to be paid for their works,
that the public has the right to enjoy them, and that publishers or
distributors be compensated for their services as well. Ideally, all
points of the triangle should be able to benefit equally from the crea-
tion of intellectual works.

